INSIDE HOCKEY

Given the precipitous declines suffered by the US/Canadian economies in the past year, one could certainly understand if this summer's NHL free agent frenzy were a bit muted. But instead, NHL GMs have continued to hand out long-term deals like Halloween candy. And as a result, it's starting to become apparent that not only was the 2004-05 lockout for naught, but that another lockout may well be in the offing.

The lockout's ostensible purpose was to ensure financial viability for all 30 NHL teams. Given what we've already seen in Phoenix - and what we're still likely to see in Nashville, Atlanta, and Florida - the CBA hasn't exactly succeeded on that front. The reason is simple, as I outlined numerous times both before and after it was negotiated: without meaningful revenue sharing, the collective-revenue scheme bears little or no meaning to each of the individual teams.

Teams in large hockey markets - like the Maple Leafs, Rangers, and Blackhawks - can spend to the salary cap with relative impunity, because their hockey-related revenues put them in a stratosphere where the cap actually represents restraint. Meanwhile, teams in smaller markets - like the aforementioned Coyotes, Predators, Thrashers, and Panthers - struggle to reach the team payroll minimum. Needless to say, that quartet of teams - amongst many others - were not on the radar screens for this year's crop of free agent talent.

The biggest fish, Marian Hossa, was near-invisible in two consecutive Cup Finals; it's fair to say that had he played better, his team could have won either time (but especially this year). As his reward for yet another disappointing finish, Hossa was given an astronomical 12-year, $62.8 million contract by the Chicago Blackhawks, locking him up until well past his 42nd birthday. It's hard to imagine Hossa having much - if any - hockey value in the latter years of that contract.

However, a closer look at the contract terms yields a better indication of why the 'Hawks did what they did. Hossa will earn $7.9 million in each of the first seven years of the deal, but his cap cost ($/years) will be far lower ($5.233 million). But over the final five years of the deal, Hossa will only earn $7.5 million in total. And this presents a pair of interesting possibilities for Chicago, none of them boding particularly well for small-market teams or their fans.

The most likely scenario is that Hossa will retire in either 2016 (when his salary drops to $4 million) or in 2017 (when his salary drops to $1 million). The bulk of the value of Hossa's contract dollars will already have been earned, and because he was only 30 years old at the time of the contract's signing, the 'Hawks won't be penalized if he retires before the contract reaches its conclusion (UFAs signed to multi-year deals who are 35 and older count against the cap whether they retire or not). Indeed, Hossa gives the 'Hawks an easy, straight-forward way to skirt the salary cap, leaving one with good reason to wonder why the Rangers didn't sign Marion Gaborik to a similarly dubious deal.

Another interesting - albeit less likely - scenario could also unfold should Hossa be convinced to continue playing through his 42nd birthday. With a salary of only $1 million (2017-18 and 2018-19) and a salary of only $750,000 (2019-20 and 2020-21), Hossa would become an incredibly valuable asset to a small-market team struggling to reach the team payroll floor. His cap cost ($5.233 million) will be over $4 million higher than his actually salary, enabling the lucky team that acquires him to achieve that team payroll minimum without actually spending the money.

That second scenario, given the fact that Hossa will turn 42 in the contract's final year, is obviously less likely than the other. But either way, it's clear that GMs and agents have started to take advantage of the gaping loopholes in this tragically flawed CBA.

With all this in mind, it's only a matter of time before the proverbial levee will break, and it will once again be time to negotiate a new CBA, one that affords the owners even greater protection against their spendthrift ways. And perhaps just as importantly, the small-market owners will clamor for even more protection against their wealthier counterparts, who always seem to find creative ways to "break" the CBA and widen the already considerable gap between the haves and the have-nots.

The NHL was quite lucky to come out of the 2004-05 lockout with the vitality that it did, capitalizing on unparalleled fan loyalty to show an improbable increase in revenue following a lost season. But there's good reason to wonder whether the fans will be as loyal - or sympathetic - if the owners claim that yet another lockout is necessary to achieve the ever-elusive financial stability they're seeking.